Many states have historic preservation regulations that, as
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1139 [Vol. 411139 in many contexts, } our primary focus is on the problem of historic preservation. Courts have decided a number of important cases about the rights of religious institutions to resist historical landmarking and the strict governmental controls over property that accompany that status. 2 Indeed, City of Boerne v. Flores,3 the 1997 case in which the Supreme Court of the United States invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as applied to the states, arose in the context of precisely such a dispute.
Our attention, however, will be on the expenditure side of the historic preservation question-to what extent may the state make grants and loans to assist in the historic preservation of buildings that are subject to mandatory preservation and are devoted to religious use?4 To our knowledge, there are no judicial decisions on this subject,5 although state administrative officers face the question regularly. True Separationists oppose both the landmarking of worship sites and the payment of grants to owners of landmarked worship sites. Committed Neutralists, however, favor both the regulation and the support of landrnarked worship sites-precisely to the same extent and on the same terms that other structures are regulated and supported. 6 And there of course may be other, less symmetrical formulations that should be open for consideration.?
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I highlights themes in the historical and judicial legacy of American Separationism, particularly as they apply to expenditures in support of the physical structures of religious entities. Part II sketches the rise of the Neutrality principle and the decline-still incomplete-of the Separationist paradigm over the past twenty years. The Article's centerpiece, Part III, turns to the particulars of historic preservation. Part III.A addresses the struggle over the question of regulatory exemptions, for structures devoted to religious use, from historic preservation laws. Part III.B introduces an intriguing pair of dueling legal opinions, from prominent executive branch lawyers, on the question of the constitutional permissibility of government grants for the historic preservation of religious structures. Part IILC describes in detail the current patterns, policies, and practices of federal and state government with respect to financial support for historic preservation of such structures, and contrasts these patterns of financial support with other current government programs through which government may support financially the physical structures owned by religious entities. Finally, Part IV appraises the details unpacked earlier in light of the larger, contemporary struggle between advocates of Separationism and Neutralism to define the dominant Religion Clause paradigm. 6 We developed at length the concepts of Separationism and Neutralism in Ira C. 37 (2002) .
1 Those whom we call Religionists, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 48, systematically favor whatever will help religious institutions; in this context, that would involve preservation grants for religious institutions without preservation regulations and orders. Those whom we call Secularists, see id, at 48-49, systematically disfavor whatever would help such institutions; here, that would involve making them subject to coercive regulation while barring them from grants. We do not think a principled account of the Religion Clauses can be attached to either of these views. As we explain in more detail at infra notes [42] [43] [44] and accompanying text, we believe that Religion Clause symmetry-pursuant to which constitutional limits on government interference with religion map precisely onto the limits of government sponsorship of religion-is a necessary condition of a persuasive account of the Religion Clauses. physical structures associated with religious institutions. 1n1899, in Bradfield u Roberts," the Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a federal appropriation for a hospital building, to be devoted exclusively to the medical care of those with contagious disease, at a medical facility controlled by the Roman Catholic church. The Court focused on the building's purposes, not the identity of the owner, and ruled that the secularity of those purposes precluded the expenditure from being an establishment of religion.
Over seventy years later, at a moment of apex for the Separationist paradigm, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of Bradfield in Tilton v. Richardson." Tilton upheld a series of federal construction grants, authorized by the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, to church-affiliated colleges and universities. The grants supported construction of libraries, a language laboratory, and buildings for science, and music and art. The Act expressly excluded "any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship, or ... any facility which . . . is used or to be used primarily in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity ." A four Justice plurality, augmented by Justice White's concurrence, concluded that the statute authorized, and the Constitution did not forbid, grants to church-affiliated institutions. The constitutional reasoning of the plurality depended heavily on the fact that the schools that had received the grants had not been shown to be "pervasively sectarian" and had maintained the federally supported buildings in a scrupulously secular fashion. Moreover, the plurality concluded that the monitoring required to insure that the schools complied with the secular use restrictions would not lead to forbidden entanglements between the state and religiously affiliated institutions.15
The Court in Tilton was unanimous, however, in striking down one portion of the federal scheme. As originally enacted, the program had limited to twenty years the "secular use" restriction on federally subsidized buildings. The expiration of the twenty-year period would have permitted the school to make sectarian uses of the building, and this, everyone on the Court agreed, 1° would involve the government in impermissibly advancing religion. Accordingly, the Court held that the restriction must, by force of constitutional requirement, extend for the life of the building.
A few years later, in Hunt u McNair," the Court extended the "secular use" principle of Bradfield and Tilton to actions of a state issuing revenue bonds, as part of a religion-neutral program, for the purpose of financing capital improvements at the Baptist College of Charleston. As in Tilton, the program included explicit restrictions on the use of bond-financed structures; all uses for sectarian instruction or worship were forbidden. Moreover, the bond scheme did not involve any direct transfer of government funds to the aided institution. The funds all came from private investors, assured of tax-favorable treatment by the state's participation in the scheme. In a six-to-three ruling, the Court held that such a scheme did not have the purpose or primary effect of advancing religion, nor did it involve the state in excessive monitoring of the religious affairs of the school.
Bradfield, Tilton, and Hunt all approved of state support for secular uses of wholly secular structures at religiously controlled institutions. None of the three, however, involved the question of permissibility of state support for buildings devoted to worship and sectarian teaching. With respect to that question, which resides in greater proximity to the problem of the Virginia Assessment, there is but one key Supreme Court decision-Committee for Public Education u Nyquist, 18 also decided in the midst of Separationism's fullest flowering.
These days, Nyquist is best known as the decision at the center of the controversy over school vouchers,19 because the case involved grants and so-called "tuition tax credits" for the benefit of parents whose children attended private schools, sectarian or otherwise. Another feature of the legislation invalidated in Nyquist, however, involved "maintenance and .repair" grants to nonpublic schools, designed to aid them in the upkeep of their physical facilities. The state calculated the amount of these grants on a per pupil basis, subject to a maximum based upon comparable expenditures in the public school system, and did not impose any "secular use" restriction upon the grants.
By a vote of eight-to-one,2° the Supreme Court struck down the grants for "maintenance and repair." The central portion of its discussion is as follows:
No attempt is made to restrict payments to those expenditures used exclusively for secular purposes, nor do we think it possible within the context of these religion-oriented institutions to impose such restrictions. Nothing in the statute, for instance, bars a qualifying school from paying out of state funds the salaries of employees who maintain the school chapel, or the cost of renovating classrooms in which religion is taught, or the cost of heating and lighting those same facilities. Absent appropriate restrictions on [such] expenditures, it simply cannot be denied that [these grants have] a primary effect that advances religion in that [they] subsidize[] directly the religious activities of sectarian elementary and secondary schools. 21
Moreover, after invoking that portion of Tilton which invalidated the complete reversion of federally financed buildings, after twenty years, to the unrestricted use of religiously affiliated colleges, the Nyquist Court concluded this portion of its opinion with a categorical assertion that hearkened back to the controversy over the Virginia Assessment. "If the State may not erect buildings in which religious activities are to take place," Justice Powell wrote, "it may not maintain such buildings or renovate them when they fall into disrepair."22 " Only justice White dissented from this portion of the Court's opinion, and he did so with virtually no elaboration of his reasons. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 820 (White, J., dissenting). [ Vol. 43:1139 Nyquist thus stands as the singular and unchallenged Supreme Court precedent on the issue of state support for structures whose uses include worship or religious instruction. Among its central premises, of course, is that religious elementary and secondary schools are likely to be "pervasively sectarian," so that any unrestricted transfers to their operations will have a forbidden "primary effect" of advancing religion. However controversial it may be today to categorize such schools in this way, 23 there can be little doubt of the sectarian character of buildings devoted exclusively to worship. If such structures are constitutionally distinctive, as the Court in Nyquist assumed and as our constitutional history suggests, government grants to preserve them seem entirely impermissible.
II. THE MOVEMENT TOWARD NEUTRALISM
In the Separationist world described in Part 1, grants for the preservation of structures devoted to worship would seem impossible to sustain constitutionally. Over the past twenty years, however, the grip of Separationism on the law of the Religion Clauses has declined, and the paradigm of Neutralism has ascended. Has this trend changed the landscape sufficiently to warrant a different outcome on the permissibility of such grants?
The shift to Neutralism has had three major components, only one of which bears directly on the issue of historic preservation grants. First, for the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has been vigorously enforcing rights of equal access to various public fora for religious causes and speakers. Agostini v. Felton,34 and in 2000, in Mitchell v. Helms,35 the Supreme Court effectively repudiated the concept that all assistance to "pervasively sectarian" institutions was constitutionally forbidden. Agostini upheld the inclusion of sectarian schools in a federal program which provided remedial instruction, by teachers who are public employees, to students attending schools in educationally deprived areas. 56 Mitchell, which also involved a religion-neutral federal program, upheld the transfer of educational materials and equipment, including computer hardware and software, to sectarian schools. In both Agostini and Mitchell, the statute required that the goods and services transferred be limited to those of a secular character.
The Court plurality in Mitchell went furthest in its rejection of the doctrinal trappings and underlying premises of Separationism. It explicitly discarded the notion of "pervasive sectarianism,"" condemning it as anti-Catholic in its origins, disturbing in the incentives it created for religious entities to dilute their faith, and unconstitutionally intrusive in the structure of adjudication it produced. Moreover, the Mitchell plurality made the full plunge toward Establishment Clause Neutralism in cases in which government transfers are challenged; so long as the category of aided institutions is religion-neutral, and the SS For the rare but important case in which a particular sect had been so targeted, see Aye, Inc. u Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) . " 521 U. S. 203 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) The O'Connor-Breyer approach, which permits aid to thoroughly sectarian institutions but not to their sectarian activities, for the moment controls the outcome in the Supreme Court. However plausible or correct their concurrence may be for programs of aid to sectarian schools, their view represents an incomplete shift from the paradigm of Separationism to that of Neutrality. Religious instruction, alone among subjects of pedagogy, remains off limits to government support. This rule, in turn, raises very difficult questions when the state assistance takes the form of payment for bricks and mortar, or any other good which cannot be segregated into religious and secular Despite this shared framework, the Steele and Lynn cases demonstrate the wide range of interpretations possible under the O'Connor-Breyer approach. In Steele, the district court found that recent Establishment Clause decisions by the Supreme Court still require the presence of "safeguards implemented to ensure that the aid will support only the secular functions of the institutions." 117 F. Supp. 2d at 705. Although the loan agreement between Lipscomb University and the Industrial Development Board prohibited the university from using structures built with loan proceeds for sectarian worship or instruction, this contractual limitation fell short of minimum constitutional requirements in two ways. td at 727. First, the board delegated its enforcement power-and the monitoring function presupposed by the enforcement power-to the bank that provided the source of Lipscomb's loans, and then made exercise of that power discretionary. Id. at 728-29. Second, the actual use of loan funds indicated no effort to segregate their use from sectarian instruction. The loan proceeds were used to build and furnish a library dominated by religious literature, with a collection that focused heavily on the university's denomination. Although the court found that the proportionate emphasis of the library itself suggested a As suggested by the inclusion of equal access claims, Free Exercise developments, and Establishment Clause decisions in our discussion of the trend from Separationism toward Neutralism, this movement is not narrowly clause-bound. These developments extend to matters involving state-imposed burdens upon religion as well as stateconferred benefits upon it; as such, they highlight the theme of symmetry between the Religion Clauses as a necessary element of any viable theory of religion's constitutional status. Full-fledged Neutralism, like some aggressive versions of Separationism, is indeed symmetrical, but both are marred by overstatement. 42 Strong Separationism treats virtually all matters pertaining to state interaction with religion as constitutionally distinctive, while strong Neutralism tries to eradicate the legal distinctiveness of all such matters.
Church of the Luhumi Babalu
In our view, the constitutionally distinctive character of religion is real but limited, and derives from a theory of the secular state. The Religion Clauses mark a jurisdictional limitation on state power. The government is limited to temporal matters and may not intrude or failure to ensure the expenditure of funds on nonsectarian purposes, the problem was compounded by the availability of loan funds to purchase texts, including religious materials, for the library. Id. at 729-31. Because the Industrial Development Board failed to ensure that tax-supported funds would be used only for secular purposes, the court enjoined any further loans to Lipscomb University. Id. at 734-35. On August 14, 2002, just as this Article was going to press, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court decision in Steele. The Sixth Circuit ruled, two-to-one, that the aid in question in Steele did not violate the Establishment Clause because the aid was indirect, and was offered to a religion-neutral class of beneficiaries. The dissent argued that the aid was direct, that David Lipscomb University was "pervasively sectarian," and that the aid therefore violated the Clause.
In Lynn, however, the Virginia Supreme Court emphasized a different element of the O'Connor-Breyer approach, the status of "genuinely independent chokes" of private actors in breaking the link between state programs and religious activities. 538 S.E.2d at 698. Where government funds reach religious entities through free private choices, '`endorsement of the religious message is reasonably attributed to the individuals who select the path of the aid," not the government. Mitchell 530 U.S. at 843 (O'Connor, J., concurring), quoted in Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 699. Because the benefit of the bond program depended entirely on the decision of individual investors to purchase Regent University's bonds, and the bond program was available to a wide range of nonprofit educational institutions, the Lynn court found no constitutional violation in a pervasively sectarian institution's participation in such a financing scheme. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 698-99. The court went on to say, however, that Regent's proposed use of the bond funds for its Divinity School was impermissible, but not because of the Establishment Clause. Instead, such financing would violate the terms of the Virginia Educational Facilities Authority Act and the Virginia Constitution's education clause. Id. at 699.
42 Much of our argument in Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, is devoted to exposing the inadequacies of asymmetrical versions of Separationism and Neutralism, and to explaining why symmetrical but overly muscular accounts of Separationism and Neut•alissn are unwise.
[Vol. 43:1139 otherwise assert its interest in the realm of the sacred, 43 a realm that includes worship practices. Government should not author, coerce, regulate, promote, or subsidize worship. Armed with this substantive view of the boundary of state competence, we strongly believe that it should be applied symmetrically to both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. What the government may not regulate, it may not support financially, because financial support inevitably involves some measure of regulatory control. That the control accompanying state financial assistance may be seen as "voluntary" from the perspective of religious institutions should not alter the constitutionally required outcome. Because the boundaries required by the Establishment Clause are jurisdictional, not "rights-based," parties cannot waive them or in any other way consent to their removal.'" Symmetry of course works in both directions, defining the scope of the permissible as well as the forbidden. What the government may regulate, it may also subsidize. The precise content of the boundary between the secular, which should be open to both regulation and support, and the religiously distinctive, which should be open to neither, must be worked out in particular legal contexts. The remainder of this piece seeks to illuminate that process of analysis and judgment in the context of historic preservation of houses of worship.
III. HISTORIC PRESERVATION OF RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES
The concepts of jurisdictional limitation and Religion Clause symmetry, developed at the end of Part II, will facilitate the discussion of the constitutional appropriateness of government grants for the historic preservation of houses of worship. In the discussion that follows, we describe the extent to which houses of worship are exempt from the regulations that control landmarked structures, and proceed through a dramatic juxtaposition of dueling opinion letters from prominent public officials on the subject of preservation grants to houses of worship. We then describe the surprising array of policies and practices of governments, federal and state, with respect to such grants. We conclude in Part IV with suggestions about where to draw a substantively sound and Religion Clause-symmetrical boundary between permissible and impermissible state involvement in the historic preservation of houses of worship.
A. The Problem of Regulation
Unsurprisingly, the process of government-mandated historic preservation of structures and neighborhoods has attracted a substantial amount of attention,45 especially as applied to structures owned by religious entities and used for worship. The process has the potential to be coercive and to create significant financial hardship. In the case of houses of worship, the preservation process can limit the freedom of a religious community to expand its ability to hold worshipers; 46 alter its structure for economic, 47 aesthetic, or liturgical48 reasons; or, in the most extreme case, reconfigure its interior worship space. 49
Courts have varied widely in their approaches to the questions raised by application of historic preservation ordinances to religious properties, and the issues have been complicated significantly by the 45 At the federal level, comprehensive efforts to preserve historic structures and neighborhoods trace back to the National Historic Preservation Act, enacted in 1966. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2000) . The Act established the National Register of Historic Places and created a mechanism for awarding grants to owners of historic properties and to state historic preservation offices. The Act did not provide a legal basis for "landmarking" historic properties without their owners' consent. A number of states and localities, however, enacted more robust landmark statutes and ordinances, which permitted historic designation and regulation of properties even if owners of such properties objected. See DANIEL R. MAN-DELKER, LAND USE LAW § § 11.22-.34 (3d ed. 1993 91 (1992) . 46 The possibility of liturgically motivated alteration of the exterior of a house of worship is contemplated in the ordinance from which such structures were held exempt in First Covenant Church u Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992 and Institutionalized Persons Act." In this space we can do more than summarize the major trends over the question of exemption from historic preservation ordinances for property devoted to religious uses. We believe, however, that a principled approach to the Religion Clauses requires symmetry between the Free Exercise question of exemption and the Establishment Clause question of ineligibility for government support. Uncertainty with respect to the exemption question is, in our view, bound to give rise to corresponding uncertainty on the question of the permissibility of the grants. For purposes of this paper, we think it will be most useful to categorize the existing approaches to exemption of religious institutions into four discrete models. The first, and broadest model, is that found in the California legislative exemption. By statute, California exempts all noncommercial property owned by religious corporations from the authority of local government to designate properties as historical landmarks.54 In East Bay Asian Local Development Corp. v. State, 55 the California Supreme Court upheld the statutory exemption against claims that it violated the California Constitution or the Establishment Clause of the federal Constitution. The court did not go so far as to find that an exemption this broad was constitutionally required; instead, it recognized that the state legislature had discretion to conclude that religious corporations would be significantly burdened by 5° 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
5°
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S. C. § 2000bb (2000) . See Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879,885-86 (D. Md. 1996) (holding that RFRA is unconstitutional, and thus offers church no defense to landmark ordinance, but that application of landmark ordinance to the church still violated the church's free exercise of religion, because the landmark ordinance was not a "neutral law of general applicability"). 
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 25373(d) (West 2002).
The exemption is not self-executing; in order to claim it, a religious corporation must object to the application of the landmarking law to its property, and "determine in a public forum that it will suffer substantial hardship 
B. The Problem of Historic Preservation Grants

I. The Dueling Opinion Letters
Whatever the outcome on the regulatory side, has the movement toward Neutralism moved far enough to encompass state grants to religious groups for the preservation and upkeep of historic structures in which religious worship still occurs? That is, in those states which recognize no exemption from landmarking for structures devoted to worship, or an interior exemption only, may the preservation of such structures be supported financially by the state?
In the late 1980s, John Shannahan, the Director of the Connecticut Historical Commission, was in a quandary over these precise questions. The Commission had authority to make grants for the purpose of preserving historic buildings in Connecticut, and many of the buildings of historic character in the state were churches. Various towns and cities in Connecticut had landmarked their historic churches, and a number of these churches had applied to the state Historical Commission for preservation grants. The Director was quite unsure, however, whether the Religion Clauses of the state or federal constitutions would permit a grant to religious groups that controlled " Our own view, expressed in Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 88-90, is that First Covenant goes too far, and Society of Jesus gets the matter right. Houses of worship should have the same rights as other nonprofit associations (but no more) to complain, on the religion-neutral ground of compelled speech, about exterior designations. Interior designations, on the other hand, may press into worship space so deeply that we think they are beyond the state's jurisdiction altogether, so that landmark designations of interiors should not be permitted with or without the church's consent. In a letter dated July 5, 1988, Attorney General Lieberman provided his opinion.n After surveying what he deemed the relevant Connecticut and federal precedents on the subject, including a pair of recent memoranda by federal agency lawyers who asserted that historic preservation grants to religious institutions were constitutionally questionable,72 Lieberman concluded that such grants were indeed permissible in a variety of circumstances. In his view, these grants served legitimate purposes in the preservation of historical structures in the state. They advanced religion only incidentally, they would not entangle the granting agency in religious affairs, and they would not be perceived as state endorsement of religion. Attorney General Lieberman distinguished Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist in three ways. First, he noted that the "maintenance and repair" grants in Nyquist left a substantial amount of discretion in the private institutions to decide how to allocate the funds; historic preservation grants are much more precisely targeted." Second, the grants in Nyquist went to a group of institutions dominated numerically by Roman Catholic schools; the Connecticut grants went to a far wider and more religiously pluralistic group of sects. 74 Third, the grants disapproved in Nyquist paid a substantial portion of the maintenance budget of sectarian schools; by contrast, the historic preservation grants tended to be significantly smaller, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of total preservation costs." Seven years later, in 1995, a federal agency renewed the question that Attorney General Lieberman had answered for Director Shannahan. The Solicitor of the United States Department of the Interior, John Leshy, had drafted an opinion on the subject of "Historic Preservation Grants for Religious Properties" for the Director of the National Park Service, Roger Kennedy. Leshy presented the draft opinion, which suggested that intervening changes in constitutional law might have removed the legal impediments to such grants, to Walter Dellinger, who was then the Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel in the United States Department of Justice. After surveying a number of the same precedents as the Lieberman letter had discussed, including in particular Nyquist and Tilton v. Richardson, and qualifying his conclusion with defensive assertions that the "question of government aid to religious institutions is ... difficult," 76 and "the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area is still developing," 77 Dellinger's memorandum expressed the ultimate judgment "that a court applying current precedent is most likely to conclude that the direct award of historic preservation grants to churches and other pervasively sectarian institutions violates the Establishment Clause?" 7S The Dellinger memorandum remains the policy of the federal government with respect to expenditures for the upkeep of buildings devoted 11 Id. at 8. 18 Id. The Dellinger memorandum also considered briefly whether the Free Exercise Clause limited the government in landmarking religious buildings in the first place. Although pretending not to take a position on the issue, the memorandum betrayed its author's Separationist leanings-also suggested by its conclusion on the question of grants-by asserting that the reasoning of the most prominent decision exempting religious houses of worship from landmarking laws Is persuasive." Id. at [5] [6] houses of worship are constitutionally permissible, similar grants to religious schools, which serve some secular purposes, should certainly be valid. This is obviously an unfinished story. For its latest chapters, we turn to policies articulated, and practices engaged in, concerning historic preservation grants by those on the front line of administration. As the tale unfolds, its lessons suggest significant-and perhaps appropriate-hesitation about the shift from Separationism to Neutralism.
Current Policy and Practice
Support for historic preservation is available from the federal government and many states, and takes a variety of forms. 8° Beyond the official recognition that comes with listing a property in the National Register of Historic Places or a state's register, owners of historic properties may also receive technical assistance, tax incentives, low-interest loans, and grants to assist them in restoring and preserving their structures. In examining the constitutional implications of providing such assistance to religious institutions, we focus on public grants. We look first at the federal programs that provide such grants, and then turn to state programs.
a. Federal Historic Preservation Grants
The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), enacted in 1966, establishes the criteria for determining which properties are eligible to be listed in the National Register, and also empowers the United States Department of the Interior to make grants-either directly or 80 There are a range of nongovernmental funding sources for preservation of houses of worship. For more information on such sources, see Partners for Sacred Places, Resources for Sacred Places, available at http://www.sacredplaces.org/resources.html (last visited Sept.
2002).
through a state historic preservation office-to subsidize preservation and restoration of listed properties." The regulations permit "properties owned by religious institutions or used for religious purposes" to be listed in the National Register only if the properties "deriv[e] primary significance from architectural or artistic distinction or historical importance,"82 and not because of the structures' religious significance. At present, several thousand properties owned by religious institutions and actively used for religious purposes are listed on the National Register. 83
At least since the early 1980s, the federal government has followed a Separationist policy regarding historic preservation grants to religious institutions." Concerns about violating the Establishment Clause led the federal government to deem such properties ineligible for any program that provides grants for "bricks and mortar." Reacting against this policy, Congress amended the NHPA in 1992 to authorize preservation grants to religious properties: "[G]rants may be made under this subsection for the preservation, stabilization, restoration, or rehabilitation of religious properties listed in the National Register of Historic Places, provided that the purpose of the grant is secular, does not promote religion, and seeks to protect those qualities that are historically significant."85 Congress's directive, however, did not change the policy of the Justice Department or the practice of the federal agencies; both policy and practice remain fundamentally Separationist. Citing the Dellinger memorandum, the National Park Service's Historic Preservation Funds Grants Manual bars grants for "construction repair costs, or real property acquisition costs" related to historic properties owned by religious institutions. 86 The "Save America's Treasures" program, administered jointly by the National 
Park Service and the National Trust for Historic Preservation, contains a similar prohibition on funding "[h]istoric properties and collections associated with an active religious organization (for example, restoration of an historic church that is still actively used as a church) . "87
The Separationist policy reflected in the Dellinger memorandum extends to other federal programs that provide grants for "bricks and mortar."88 The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program authorizes the Department to make grants for preservation and reconstruction of structures serving a wide variety of purposes in a community, benefiting both commercial and nonprofit institutions 8 9 The CDBG program, however, imposes tight restrictions on any funding used to rehabilitate structures owned by religious entities. In order to receive funding, the structure must be leased to a "wholly secular" entity-for no more than the fair market value of the property before the funded rehabilitation-and used only for secular purposes.99 Similarly, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides Federal Disaster Assistance grants to a broad variety of "non-profit facilities" that provide basic services to the general public, including schools, museums, community centers, and libraries.°9 The category of nonprofit facilities eligible for FEMA disaster assistance grants specifically excludes facilities used for religious purposes.92
Despite this rather consistent Separationism, a closer look at federal programs that provide grants for "bricks and mortar" reveals a somewhat more complicated picture." Religious properties affected by disasters are eligible for low-interest loans through a program administered by the Small Business Administration." The owners of such properties may receive FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grants as part of a community-wide mitigation project. 95 Indeed, FEMA's website celebrates the financial support provided by its program of Hazard Mitigation Grants to relocate a church out of a flood plain." In addition, the Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996 provides low-income reconstruction loans to any nonprofit organization, including religious institutions, victimized by arson or terrorism motivated by racial or religious animus." When several historic churches-and a number of other houses of worship-were seriously damaged because of the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, FEMA and the Department of Housing and Urban Development initially refused to provide federal aid for their reconstruction." The agencies later relented when Congress specifically directed that "notwithstandstate and local governments and Indian tribes, are eligible to receive public disaster assistance grants).
92 Id. § 206.221(e) (1) (category of educational facility eligible for disaster assistance grant "does not include buildings, structures, and related items used primarily for religious purposes or instruction"); FEMA Response and Recovery Directorate Policy No. 9521.1 (Aug. 11, 1998) , available at www.fetna.gov/m/pa/9521_1.shun (defining "community center" in 44 C.F.R. § 206.221(e) (6) to exclude "Facilities established or primarily used for religious-or similar-activities"). 93 See, for example, the recent announcement that HUD will permit the use of grant money for maintenance and repair of structures owned by religious institutions. See supra. 341, 35411.22 (1999) . [Vol. 43:1139 ing any other provision of law, such funds may be used for the repair and reconstruction of religious institution facilities damaged by the explosion in the same manner as private nonprofit facilities providing public services."99 Ultimately, Oklahoma City churches received over six million dollars in federal funds to help repair damage from the bombing. 100
• Federal historic preservation programs also depart from the robust Separationism articulated in the Dellinger memorandum. Although Department of the Interior policies prohibit the use of federal funds for "development"-preservation and renovation-projects involving historic religious properties, the policies allow grants to such properties for "pre-development" costs. 101 "Pre-development" costs include architectural plans for restoration or renovation of the structure, consulting fees incurred in preparing forms for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places, and other similar expenses.
The restoration of Ebenezer Baptist Church, financed by a grant through the "Save America Mt Speaker, Congress is aware that several downtown churches were severely damaged as a result of the April 19, 1995, terrorist bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Among these are First United Methodist Church, First Baptist Church, St. Paul's Episcopal Cathedral and St. Joseph's Catholic Church. These churches assisted in the emergency relief effort immediately after the bombing and one was even used as a temporary morgue for victims of the blast.
These religious institutions have been informed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency that under current regulations they are not eligible for any federal disaster assistance for the repair and reconstruction of their facilities. However, Congress recognizes that the Oklahoma City bombing is a unique case. The bombing was a single, man-made assault directed against our national government. These churches, like the other businesses and residences in the damaged area, were innocent bystanders to a violent attack on the federal government. This special instance is therefore distinguished from other kinds of disasters in which religious buildings may be damaged. Congress thus agrees that religious institutions in Oklahoma City should be eligible for the federal assistance provided in this bill in the same manlier as nonprofit organizations providing public services. of his leadership of the civil rights movement, and he preached many of his famous sermons on civil rights, race relations, and civil disobedience from its pulpit. The congregation of Ebenezer Baptist still owns the church property, but leased the historic church to the National Park Service as part of a deal that provided the congregation with a parcel, adjacent to the historic church, on which the congregation has built a new sanctuary.'" Under the terms of its ninety-nineyear lease to operate the church as a historic site, the Park Service conducts tours and offers programs open to the public. The congregation of Ebenezer holds its regular services in the new sanctuary but remains free to use the historic church for special worship events, at which times the Park Service closes the church to the general public.'" Accurate presentation of Dr. King's life, not to mention the entire civil rights movement, requires attention to the important role of African-American churches, but a consistent Separationist policy would preclude the close relationship between the Park Service and Ebenezer Baptist Church.'"
b. State Historic Preservation Grants
To the extent that state historic preservation offices act merely as conduits of federal funds, their grants are bound by the Separationist policies reflected in the Dellinger memorandum. A significant number of states, however, provide additional funds for historic preservation, and these state programs reflect quite disparate attitudes toward financing religious properties.'" We look first at programs that follow Feb. 20, 1999, at Fl ("A 99 year lease will enable the Park Service to offer tours, lectures, book signings and other programs, including live choral performances at the historic church. However, members of the congregation will still be allowed to celebrate special occasions there."). the federal government's Separationism, and then at programs that adopt the Neutralism represented by the Lieberman letter.
i. Separationist Policies
Of the state historic preservation programs that share the federal government's Separationist policy, which bars most preservation grants to religious properties, some appear to do so because they find the Dellinger memorandum either persuasive or binding. 106 Other states adopt a Separationist policy on particular state-law grounds. In .California, state historic preservation grants to religious organizations appear to be prohibited by the 1923 decision of the state's Court of Appeals in Frohliger V. Richardson, which held that a state appropriation for restoration of the San Diego Mission was barred by the state constitution's absolute ban on funding sectarian institutions. 107 In Georgia, the state's Division for Natural Resources recently discontinued its practice of awarding historic preservation grants to religious organizations because of concerns that the practice violated the state constitution's (strongly Separationist) religion clause.'" Virginia also has strict 107 See generally Frohliger, 218 P. 497. The California Constitution provides that no government entity may "grant anything to or in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian purpose." /d. at 498 (citing CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 30 (now located at art. XVI, § 5)). The current picture in California is more complicated than the state constitutional analysis in Frohliger would suggest. Some "public spaces" in religious properties seem to be eligible for state historic preservation grants, though the precise nature of the eligible projects is unclear from the grants guidelines, which indicate that the questions will be constitutional limits on state grants to religious organizations, but allows churches to transfer ownership of the property to a secular nonprofit institution-which would be eligible for state historic preservation grants, and would operate the church as a historic site open to the public-and the congregation can then lease the worship space back from the secular entity." 9
ii. Neutralist Policies Many, and perhaps most, of the states that offer their own historic preservation grants do not share the federal government's Separationist policies, 11° though these states impose a wide range of conditions on grants to religious organizations. One feature shared by all programs that finance historic preservation of religious propertiesand indeed by the federal requirements for listing religious properties in the National Register of Historic Places-is that the property's religious organizations") (copy on file with the authors). Georgia's state constitution provides: "No money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, cult, or religious denomination or of any sectarian institution." GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2, para. 110 Because the Establishment Clause binds the states as well as the federal government, the Dellinger memorandum's interpretation, if correct, should apply to both federal and state funding streams. That many states deviate from the memorandum reflects (1) the phenomenon of independent voices in constitutional interpretation within the federal system, and (2) substantial uncertainty about the content and path of Establishment Clause principles.
[Vol. 43:1139 significance is determined on secular terms, such as its architectural merit or role in important historical events."' A common condition limits grants to religious institutions to repairs that are publicly visible. Texas and New Jersey, for example, only support work on the exterior of religious properties." 2 Other jurisdictions, however, permit grants for restoring and preserving the interior of religious properties, provided that the properties offer the public a reasonable opportunity to view the interior "without being required to participate in or witness any religious activides."" 3 The New York State historic preservation program requires grantees that use grants for interior restoration to open the property "to the general public at least 12 times a year at reasonably spaced intervals."'" Pennsylvania requires that the benefited property "must be open and accessible to the public on a regular basis, not less than 100 days per year." 115 In requiring public accessibility to state-subsidized interior portions of historical structures, these agencies treat religious institutions no differently than other grantees.
Somewhat more complicated are restrictions designed to segregate expenditures with primarily historical, architectural, or cultural value from benefits that flow primarily to the religious use of the property. Several states restrict the use of grants for "liturgical items."116 Architectural elements included in this category are "stained glass windows illustrating religious themes," "steeple crosses,"118 and altars. 119 Other states highlight their funding of such items, however, as central to preserving and restoring the fabric of historically significant features of the property. 12° Vermont Historic Preservation grants are regularly awarded for preservation of church steeples. 121 Texas attempts to draw the line between appropriate and inappropriate purposes by funding only "the difference between a rehabilitation project and a restoration project;" the religious organization must pay the rehabilitation costs-that which is necessary to make the space useable-and the Texas Trust Preservation Fund will assist in expenditures beyond that point aimed at preserving or restoring the historic fabric of the property. 122 Connecticut, following the Lieberman letter, restricts any state preservation grants "without which certain religious activities could not continue," such as "extensive structural support work in a church,"123 although other states fund work on the basic structure and foundations of religious properdes. 124
Finally, as a condition of receiving historic preservation grants, religious properties (like all other grantees) typically must convey to the granting agency a historic preservation easement. 125 The easement binds the grantee and the grantee's successors to both affirmative and negative covenants, for a duration that may vary according to the value of the grant. A small grant may require only an easement for a term of ten years, whereas a substantial grant may require an easement in perpetuity. 126 The basic affirmative obligation is a promise to maintain the benefited property-the whole property, typically, and not just the portion affected by the grant-according to specific preservation standards.' 27 In addition, grantees usually must guarantee reasonable public access to the property." 8 The chief negative covenant is the grantee's promise not to make any changes, including demolition, to the historic features of the structure without the consent of the preservation agency. 129 If the grantee breaches one of the covenants, the preservation agency is entitled to bring an acdon for whatever injunctive relief is appropriate to cure the breach, including orders to restore improper changes to the structure or to maintain aspects of the property that the grantee has neglected. 13°W
. PRESERVATION GRANTS, CONSTITUTIONAL SYMMETRY, AND THE
NEW SEPARATIONISM
The story of historic preservation grants to religious institutions can be told in at least two ways. The first is a tale of Religion Clause jurisprudence as an inexorable march from Separationism to Neutralism. In this account, the Dellinger memorandum, and the federal 155 The public access requirement is not unique to religious entities but is a general feature of public grants to nongovernmental entities, and is typically included as an affirmative covenant in the preservation easement. The New Jersey program is a good example of this requirement:
Public access is required to all resources receiving capital funds. The Trust and the grantee will negotiate the days and hours that the property will be open, based on the type of work funded by the grant, if the property is not accessible to the public at the time of application.
• A grant for exterior work requires the applicant to open the grounds to the public, but does not compel the applicant to make the interior accessible to the public.
• Interior work will require the applicant to open the building to the public.
• No additional access is necessary for properties open to the public on a regular basis, such as museums, libraries, or schools.
New Jersey Guidelines, supra note 112, at 19. 129 See Illinois Grant Program Manual, supra note 125; New Jersey Guidelines, supra note 112, at 19. The power to enforce the easement is generally given to the preservation agency that made the grant, but some grantors also permit the easement's benefit to be given to a different (usually local) historic society. See, e.g policies that rely on it, are anachronisms, the last vestiges of an era in which religious institutions were systematically excluded from a variety of public benefits. The ultimate destination of this march lies beyond the Lieberman letter, which gives only qualified permission to a state historical commission to make grants to preserve religious properties."' Neutralism, taken to its conclusion, ends up eliminating all distinctions between religious and secular institutions.
A second version of the story draws on a somewhat different account of Religion Clause jurisprudence. This account, with which we are sympathetic, redraws rather than obliterates the idea of Separationism, and stands in tension with Neutralism's relentless leveling of the distinction between religious and secular institutions. Though earlier Separationists overstated the distinctiveness of religious institutions, the Neutralists ignore the constitutionally salient reasons for maintaining limits on government with respect to such institutions." 2 In this revised and more limited Separationism, defining the boundary between sacred and secular remains the essential task of Religion Clause theory. The distinctions reflected in contemporary state policies about preservation grants-exterior versus interior, liturgical items versus others, structural support versus historic fabric-represent intuitive efforts to discern, in ways more nuanced than the absolute Separationism reflected in the Dellinger memorandum, this line between sacred and secular.
At the heart of this more limited Separationism is the principle of Religion Clause symmetry. The requirement of symmetry is not an aesthetic one; rather, it reflects a larger, substantive theory of the Religion Clauses, pursuant to which the realms of worship of, and faith in, the transcendent lie beyond the jurisdiction of the state.'" This jurisdictional limit remains the same regardless of whether the legal context is one of regulatory burdens or state-conferred benefits.
If Religion Clause symmetry is a guiding principle of constitutional architecture, one helpful way to approach the problem of line drawing in the provision of government funds to religious institutions is to analyze the question of permissible government regulation of such institutions. Like grant-making officials, courts and legislatures that have considered the application of landmarking ordinances to religious entities have wrestled with a problem of linedrawing. They 131 Lieberman Letter, supra note 71, at 15 (requiting disclaimers of government endorsement, and suggesting limits to state financing of structural support).
132 We develop these reasons at greater length in Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 78-92.
have been pressed to decide whether exemptions should extend to all noncommercial property owned by such entities, or just houses of worship, or, more restrictive still, only the interiors of worship structures. 1 M Our own view, advanced in earlier work, is that a Neutralist approach-including a robust, religion-neutral doctrine of compelled speech-provides appropriate protection for the exterior of religious properties."5 The exteriors of houses of worship, like the exteriors of other buildings, often form vital parts of the shared landscape, the cultural environment of the community in which the .structures are located.
Regulation of the exterior of houses of worship, subject only to a religion-neutral doctrine permitting escape from being compelled to advance a message to which the organization no longer adheres, will allow for the landmarking of religious features of exterior design, Steeples, religious gargoyles, and statuary on the outside of a worship structure, and other exterior symbols associated with a faith tradition all fall within the scope of appropriate historic preservation orders because all are visible to passersby and constitute part of the historically significant design features of the property or neighborhood.
With respect to the interior of houses of worship, however, we believe that Separationist concerns about proper limits on the government's power with respect to religion require distinctive protections. Although the government's aesthetic and historic reasons for regulating interiors are no different from the justification for regulating exteriors, state intrusion on the interior of worship structures presents an unusually high risk that state agents will become co-authors of the religious experiences of those who worship in those spaces. Even if state agents make efforts to be sensitive to those concerns, a negotiation between state officials and church leaders over the location of an altar, or other liturgically significant features of interior design, would be an impermissible entanglement if ever one is to be found. "6 184 For discussion of the current exemption models used by legislatures and courts, see supra notes 45-70 and accompanying text.
to Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 74-76,88-90.
I" Although our analysis does not depend on the history of religious and legal attitudes about the interior of worship spaces, that history suggests that these spaces have for thousands of years been thought to possess a special character. Many viewed the interior of temples and churches as sacred and holy ground, and excluded the unclean from these spaces. Moreover, the concept of sanctuary, though never respected in American law, recognized the interior of religious structures as embassy-like, territory foreign to the nationstate in which the structures were located. State agents, pursuing state purposes, could be [Vol. 43:1139 This analysis of the scope of regulatory power over religious institutions suggests a resolution to the dilemma of historic preservation grants to such entities. Because the state has constitutionally sufficient reasons to regulate the exterior of houses of worship, the state should also be free to subsidize the preservation of these exteriors, including religious symbols that constitute a part of such exteriors.'" Both regulation and subsidy are justified by the public, secular purposes served by historic preservation of the exteriors of religious structures.
In contrast, the state should be forbidden to subsidize what it cannot regulate, because the subsidy will inevitably be accompanied by regulatory conditions. The interiors of religious spaces undoubtedly possess great architectural, historical, and cultural significance, but they are also the places in which the faith envelops believers in the imagery and experience of reverence.'" Even if the religious institution consents to government regulation of the interior space, as a condition of receiving a preservation grant, enforcement of such conditions involves the same constitutional defect as direct regulation. 139 Although the government may solve that problem by providing grants for preservation of interiors without such conditions, unrestricted direct funding of religious entities raises different, and perhaps even greater, constitutional problems. State expenditures require a public, secular purpose; without conditions that guarantee 137 Under the doctrine of compelled speech, a religious institution may be able to raise a religion-neutral constitutional defense to some types of regulation of the exterior, but the institution should also be free to waive that defense, and accept state regulation. Whether the waiver can be questioned or withdrawn by successors in interest with respect to the property presents a nice question, but not a religion-specific one. In contrast, a religious institution may not waive the Establishment Clause concerns implicated in regulation of the interior of houses of worship.
136 If the state finances the preservation of interiors of houses of worship on the condition that the public be provided access to such spaces, there exists a possibility, however remote, that the state is impermissibly steering public viewers into a religious experience. Such steering presents Establishment Clause questions akin to those presented in much stronger form by government-financed vouchers for purchase of services in religioninfused settings. For discussion of the steering problem associated with vouchers, see Ira C. 139 If the benefit of the preservation were held by a nongovernmental entity, the question of enforcement of conditions involving the interior of worship spaces opens up difficult constitutional questions about state action, of the sort initially addressed in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). that the money will be used for such a purpose, state transfers to religious institutions are forbidden. 14°A lthough it might seem solid, the boundary between interior and exterior presents some challenging questions, best exemplified by the dilemma of stained-glass windows."' Such windows may have great historical or artistic significance, and make a substantial contribution to the structure's external appearance. Such windows often present religious themes, however, and help to shape the worship experience through the play of light and imagery. Following our earlier mode of analysis, we look first at the regulatory question. May the state require a religious entity to preserve and maintain stained-glass windows that convey religious themes and are visible from within the sanctuary? We think the answer must be no. State control over the religious imagery in a worship space involves the entanglement concerns that motivate our basic judgment about state regulation of the interiors of houses of worship. Thus, if the state may not regulate the windows because of the religious imagery visible from within the worship space, the state also may not pay for the preservation or maintenance of such windows.
With respect to stained-glass windows that do not involve religious themes, regulation designed to preserve such windows presents a closer constitutional question. On the one hand, the use of color in such windows, and the ways in which they regulate the flow of light into the worship space, may influence religious experience. This argument, however, may prove too much for our taste; by analogy, at 140 Even the most avid supporters of Neutralism in Mitchell u Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) , adhere to this proposition. Id. at 807-08 (plurality opinion). 141 The question of whether government funds may be used to pay for structural repairs, such as restoring a building's foundation or reinforcing a load-bearing wall, provides another good example of the difficulty of distinguishing interior and exterior repairs. We noted above that states have reached different answers to this question. See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text. The Lieberman Letter suggests that government financing is impermissible when it provides a benefit 'without which certain religious activities could not continue." Lieberman Letter, supra note 71, at 15. We disagree with the premise underlying Attorney General Lieberman's conclusion-that the extent of the benefit conferred on the religious entity should be the measure of the financing's constitutionality. Instead, we look to the legitimacy of the state's interest in the structure's preservation in that particular form. If the structural repairs go to the integrity of the building-that is, the continued safety and stability of the structure-the government's interest seems little different in the case of a religious building than any other building. In such cases, we believe that the government should be free to finance structural repairs of historic religious properties. If the building's integrity is not at issue, and the repairs affect only the interior of the space, then the constitutionality of the grant is much more doubtful, [Vol. 43:1139 least some exterior features, such as building height, may also influence the experience of worshipers within. In our view, if the windows do not portray religious themes, or are not visible from within the worship space, the case for the constitutional permissibility of state financing becomes considerably stronger.
CONCLUSION
Even if our intuitions about the constitutional status of historic preservation grants meet with some disagreement-and we expect that they will-we think that the context of historic preservation of houses of worship provides a rich field for exploring fundamental questions about the relationship between the state and religious institutions. Neither the strong Separationist solution, which would forbid both regulation and subsidy of the historic character of houses of worship, nor the Neutralist's acceptance of regulation and subsidy of religious entities on equal terms with other institutions, tracks the current trajectory of constitutional law. Moreover, neither view captures the dual nature of religious institutions, perhaps best reflected in their structures, which are at once the places in which the defining activity of the faith occurs, and at the same time vital parts of a community's historical and cultural legacy.
